A Long-Term Strategy for a Safer Pakistan

General and self-appointed President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan currently faces his stiffest opposition—from the public, Islamists, and elites alike—since taking office after a coup . The next few weeks will mark the return of two ex-premiers to Pakistan to challenge his military regime in upcoming elections, the results of which will have important consequences on domestic stability and relations with the U.S.

The aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001 allowed Pakistan to relinquish its ties to the Taliban and improve its relationship with the U.S. in an unprecedented manner. General Musharraf has given public support for the so-called “War on Terror” and initiated crackdowns on local militants at surprising political and personal costs. The Pakistani Army, having captured key terrorist leaders like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, still appears the most capable of dealing with radical Islamists because it has an understanding of tribal dynamics unmatched by any potential foreign force.

However, the July release of the annual U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reported that U.S. support for the Pakistani government since late 2001 has not significantly weakened terrorists along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.

The July incident at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, in which at least 100 hard-line Islamic students were killed by Pakistani troops, is indicative of the remnants of al-Qaeda that Musharraf’s regime has allowed to fester in the provinces.

Many remain uneasy about Musharraf’s March dismissal of the country’s chief justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, who had objected to another five-year term with Musharraf as both president and army chief. The Pakistani Supreme Court overrode this decision and reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry in late July, in a historic show of dissent from within the government.

The court most recently ruled that Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister deposed in 1999, could return to the country. This bold move further complicates any prediction about the upcoming elections this fall, as Sharif’s popularity would likely split Musharraf’s centrist Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q).

A peaceful transition to democratic rule in Pakistan is undoubtedly in the long-term interest of the U.S. In a recent Financial Times editorial, Philip Gordon wrote that “repression will create more terrorists than the government could arrest or kill. Islamic parties in Pakistan have never done well in free elections and would not win today.” Indeed, Islamists have garnered about 11% of the vote in their highest showing in 2002.

In August, the U.S. quietly pushed for a power-sharing agreement between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistani People’s Party, a now-exiled former prime minister also scheduled to return to the country. Such an agreement would have required Musharraf to resign as chief of the powerful Pakistani Army and may have put weight behind moderate, secular forces in the country. However, the proposed deal recently fell through and Bhutto is coming back nonetheless.

Certainly, Musharraf’s heyday is long past. But many argue that losing his leadership could stymie some previously effective counterterrorism efforts undertaken by his government. Indeed, a critical element of our relationship with Pakistan is an emphasis on local solutions where counterterrorism operations are undertaken by Pakistani security forces alone.

Washington has recently been abuzz with questions of unilateral U.S. operations in Pakistan if the country can‘t eradicate extremists. Talking openly about violating a third country’s sovereignty is synonymous with condemning Musharraf as completely powerless to make decisions independent of the U.S. and fomenting further instability by diminishing what little of his credibility remains. It also dissuades Pakistanis from taking responsibility for security issues within their own borders.

There is no easy formula for balancing Pakistani domestic stability and American security concerns. It is certain, however, that a U.S. policy that redistributes aid to preempt the root causes of terror can immediately begin to foster long-term security in South Asia and beyond.

First of all, successful funding must go beyond tit-for-tat aid, and military success should be only one level on which strategies are determined. According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report, of the $843 million in assistance to Pakistan in 2007, only 10 percent is development-oriented—the remainder was allocated to the military.

The U.S. has recently designated $150 million to strengthen local community involvement for the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA). This region is the most underdeveloped part of the country and home to most of its al-Qaeda sympathizers. With an 18 percent literacy rate (versus around 44 percent elsewhere), aid to FATA should include educational and job initiatives, as suggested by the 9-11 Commission.

In addition to investing in the crucial but long-term process of development, the U.S. is also considering some options that could have more immediate results, such as military aid conditionally based upon Pakistan’s success, rather than solely its efforts, at eliminating terrorist training camps. However, the question of measuring “success” is complicated by multiple root causes of political violence which are not easily quantifiable. Ultimately, preventative aid should be coordinated with a wide demographic of local partners throughout Pakistan, from Islamists to “moderates.”

A final suggestion is for the U.S. to press for an internally recognized border between India and Pakistan in the predominantly Muslim area of Kashmir. This approach would encourage regional confidence-building measures in South Asia and could be the basis for peace talks between the two powers. Furthermore, since militants have claimed Islam is under attack in Kashmir, managing the dispute would facilitate security by eliminating a cause of religious violence.

As Pakistan approaches this crucial election, U.S. policy makers should consider the democratic process as one of several key elements in our future relationship with the country. Another element is fostering local responsibility for regional problems. Finally, change will not occur overnight, but it can commence immediately with a more nuanced and far-sighted U.S. aid strategy. If we have learned one lesson from the reconstruction of Iraq, it is that foreign military prowess is meaningless without access to basic goods and long-term, local political solutions that give people a stake in their futures.