The Case for Globalization: Swipe-Access Edition

In what seems to be a yearly tradition, the debate over whether to institute free swipe access between Barnard and Columbia has risen again, taking its rightful place next to ROTC and Manhattanville as one of those issues that is always debated, yet never seems to be resolved. The arguments against swipe access are all too familiar at this point. Barnard claims that swipe access would compromise the security of the Quad, leading some members of the Columbia community to oppose any measures that aren’t reciprocal. Although these arguments might preoccupy the administration and student councils ad nausea, to most students of Barnard and Columbia, they are little more than peripheral concerns—to them, swipe access is an issue of integration and movement between the schools. Thus, what we have is a debate with broad implications, which will invariably privilege some groups over others—in other words, a perfect candidate for economic analysis, specifically as a matter of international trade.

Let’s suppose that Columbia and Barnard are each “countries,” endowed with productive factors in the form of men and women—just for the record, I am not claiming that women are a commodity in any pejorative sense. Rather, women and men serve as equally productive inputs, producing some positive output within college dorm rooms. Now, it would be wrong of me to speculate on what men and women actually do inside their rooms, but let’s assume that it is some mutually beneficial activity that requires a great deal of exertion from both parties, although it is ultimately worth the effort—homework.

Now that we have set up all of the basic elements of our model, we can analyze the current state of Columbia-Barnard relations and identify the effects of a new swipe-access policy. First, let’s consider the Columbia market. Columbia has a relatively equal number of men and women, so in a state of no integration, most women would be able to find men to do homework with. Barnard changes the mix, however, by increasing the supply of women in the population, thereby creating more competition in the market for doing homework.

This dynamic reveals a few key results that are crucial aspects of the free swipe-access debate. First, Columbia men unambiguously benefit from Barnard imports because of increased variety. There is also a possible efficiency gain, although this claim is only based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that Barnard women are easier to do homework with. Secondly, Barnard women unambiguously gain from unrestricted movement because they now have access to a much larger homework market.

Columbia women mostly lose from Barnard competition, since they no longer have monopoly access to the male factor in the homework market. We also have two additional cases of Columbia men and women who enjoy doing homework with members of the same gender. For the women in this category, integration with Barnard is a wholly positive development, while for the men, it is mostly neutral.

Now that we understand who wins and loses, we can address the swipe-access issue outright. Having to be signed in to dorms poses a cost of trade, which naturally restricts some Barnard women from going to Columbia, and Columbia men from going to Barnard. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves who is being shut out of the market? There already exist a corps of Barnard women willing to pay the time and effort costs necessary to enter Columbia dorms because they judge that it is worth it. Thus, we can infer that those Barnard students who don’t cross the street refrain either because they have no interest, or because they believe their chances of finding a Columbia study-buddy too low to justify the effort. For these individuals, free swipe access bequeaths few gains, since the issues keeping them from Columbia were probably larger than getting signed in. This is an important point because it counters the claim that free swipe access would mean more competition for Columbia women.

Cross-school mingling has been occurring since the schools were founded, and the market has reached an equilibrium whereby the vast majority of Columbia and Barnard students who are interested in doing homework together pay the cost of trade. Instituting universal swipe access—even without Barnard’s complete reciprocation—results in a large collective gain for this group, since they can now devote more time to doing all-important homework. What is more interesting is the fact that virtually no one loses from free swipe access, unless you believe that there are hordes of Barnard women who would come to Columbia if only it weren’t for having to be signed in.

I realize that examining Columbia-Barnard relations through the context of international trade is unorthodox and that the model is unable to consider several other matters at play in the debate. However, I think that a key virtue of this analysis is that it counters the two most common arguments against swipe access, showing clearly that it would not lead to a large influx of Barnard women, and that even unilateral liberalization by Columbia would still carry large benefits. Ultimately, I hope that readers keep in mind some of the key logical conclusions drawn from this discussion, and that they support swipe access reform in the name of more—and better—homework.

Jon Hollander is a Columbia College junior majoring in economics.
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