The end of Arab diplomacy

From a very young age, we’re taught to resolve our confrontations through negotiation. If a child is pushed into a sandbox by another child, you don’t tell the first kid to push back and counter with an act of revenge. While it may go against our natural impulse of seeking an eye for an eye, our elders instill in us the principle of turning the other cheek—because that is the right and smart thing to do.

I would like to propose a philosophical reevaluation of this sandbox scenario through a study of the recently concluded Arab League summit in Sirte, Libya. This sandbox evaluation is entirely appropriate when one considers the remarkable amount of child-like bickering and grandstanding that occurred in Libya, of course at the hands of the master child himself, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi—the self proclaimed “dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa.” But more substantively, the evaluation is a necessary one in assessing the sustainability, success, and efficacy of modern-day diplomacy in the Middle East. While liberal arts schools like Columbia place an emphasis on peace-building, conflict resolution, and above all diplomacy, it’s worth questioning how effective and realistic these methods are in achieving success in the mitigation of long-standing conflicts like those that plague the Middle East.

Two obvious questions result from the aforementioned statement: One, how does one gauge success in conflict mitigation and two, what alternative methods could possibly exist? On the first, with regard to the Middle East, there are obvious indicators of success—a cessation of violence, the end of ill-will, stability, an accepted standard of human rights, etc. However, there are also less obvious ones, ones I would venture to say are more important despite their neglect in years past. Such indicators are popular engagement, mass representation, and overall national support for policies of main actors in the region. The reason why the Arab public sees the Arab League summit as an unmitigated failure year after year in the eyes of Arabs across the Middle East is because Arabs see their leaders as being too soft on their issues, bending over too quickly to the stipulations of the U.S. and Israel. Essentially, Arabs feel that their leaders are negotiating too much and acting too little.

This sentiment is a recurring feature of Arab League meetings because the agenda-topper at these summits is always the same: the Palestine-Israel conflict. This year’s summit, in particular, was named “the Jerusalem Summit,” and took place just days after the Arab (and U.S.) embarrassment that was Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to pursue settlement growth in East Jerusalem despite a deliberate request from Joe Biden against such activity. Since 2002, when the peace process was revived by the Arab League summit in Beirut, only to quickly fail after a resumption of hostility between Israelis and Palestinians, two schools of thought have emerged dividing Arab leaders.

The first school is called the moderate school and is best voiced by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It supports the pursuit of a peace process through a land-for-peace system—Arabs will go to the table with Israel and recognize it only if the Jewish state promises to return land like East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights to the Arabs. The second school, the resistant school, refuses a peace process or any diplomatic engagement with Israel, instead calling upon armed resistance. This school is best championed by the Syrians and—making this year’s summit particularly lively—the Libyans. Again, the dichotomy surfaces between negotiating with the enemy and sticking to one’s guns. The former has obviously failed, but does that mean the second one will do any better?

This is where the second question factors in. If the peace process continues to fail, does that necessarily mean that armed resistance is the best means option for the Palestinians? Obviously not. Armed resistance to the likes of what Hamas has been pursuing would be unnecessarily violent and reflect poorly upon the Arabs at large, especially if the Syrians were to join the ranks of fighters in Palestine. What I am suggesting to Arab leaders as an alternative to failed diplomacy is the unbridled articulation of what their people actually want. To Arabs, the “moderates” propped up by the U.S. are accommodationists, the resisters at times heroes and at others radicals. If Arab leaders release a strong, unified message expressing popular Arab frustration and cynicism towards the obstinacy of Israel, this is likely to be exponentially more effective than any other act.

While Arabs may not want U.S.-supported textbook diplomacy, the expression of their desires is certainly diplomatic. As Americans, we can place our hope in a group of twenty-two decrepit leaders who meet yearly to curse at each other and draft vaguely phrased resolutions on highly contentious issues. Or, we can begin to seriously explore how we will work with the demands of the 358 million-strong Arabs who are currently unwilling to budge. Down the line, we should be working to convince the Arab public that a middle ground is best, starting from the bottom and moving up, not imposing the will of the top on the bottom.

Perhaps the solution to the sandbox dilemma is neither telling the pushed kid to push back nor telling him to do nothing. It lies in the eradication of the child’s impulse to want to push back at all.

Rhonda Shafei is a Columbia College sophomore. She is the publisher of the Columbia Political Union and the director-general of CMUNCE. The Politics of Hummus runs alternate Thursdays.