Back Where We Belong

Over the last two weeks, the presidential race finally returned to Iraq.

It began in the last week of February when Senator Barack Obama (D-Ill.) and Senator John McCain (D-Ariz.) publicly traded caustic remarks on Al-Qaida’s presence in the country. Then, over the weekend, Senator Hillary Clinton’s (D-N.Y.) campaign released an ad attacking Obama’s experience in foreign affairs (the “red phone” ad), and Obama responded with a reminder that she had voted for the war. It was a welcome return to an issue that, almost unbelievably, had faded into the background for much of the recent campaign, replaced by issues ranging from NAFTA to tax returns. In California on Super Tuesday, for example, “Iraq” trailed “the economy” as the most important issue by 14 percent among Democrats, while it sat third among Republicans, behind “the economy” and “illegal immigration.” In Texas this past Tuesday, “the economy” was twice as popular a response as “Iraq” among Democrats, while the war tied for last among Republicans. Now that Iraq has returned to the forefront of the race, concerned Americans need to ensure that, in the upcoming election, it remains front and center on our list of issues, because the country needs to make a choice.

The reason behind the loss of public interest in Iraq is not hard to determine. As many commentators have suggested, last year’s troop surge has had a profound impact on the military situation in Iraq. American military and Iraqi civilian casualties have fallen, insurgent attacks have declined, and so forth, as American troops persist at surge levels and more and more Iraqi security forces are trained. General Petraeus’ strategy of protecting civilians has also helped lower these numbers. What was once a rampant insurgency has begun to look somewhat more containable. As a result, the headlines coming in from Iraq contain fewer American coffins, and so the average American’s interest in the war has fallen, while worried economists have increased fears over the economy. Furthermore, many Americans, according to recent polls, have seen the surge as successful.

Yet political and infrastructural problems remain in Iraq. I am currently taking a seminar on insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the class has found that one factor critical to any successful counterinsurgency is a strong, legitimate government. No matter how favorable the military situation might be, the insurgency will continue as long as people perceive their government as either weak or corrupt, let alone both. The Iraqi government faces substantial obstacles in its effort to gain the support it needs. For example, it remains torn between various factions. Ba’athist reintegration proceeds only slowly. The new budget will bring the same squabbling and factionalism it has brought since the new Iraqi parliament convened, and there is no guarantee the parliament will stay together this time. Most importantly, the country’s three main ethnic groups have continued their history of hostility and suspicion toward each other. These are not the problems that most Americans care as much about, but they are just as critical to our success or failure in the country.

The surge has changed the war, but it cannot end it. War supporters have discovered that the principle of “more troops equals better security” actually works. Yet what does the country do from here? It would be difficult to increase troops much beyond the current levels, of course, because our armed forces are already stretched thin and there is no chance of the American people submitting to a draft. Furthermore, even history’s most successful counterinsurgencies, such as those in post-World War II Malaya and the Philippines, take much longer than one or two years. Malaya, often considered a model counterinsurgency operation, took 15 years. Additionally, both counterinsurgencies had astronomically high troop ratios. Withdrawing all troops quickly, on the other hand, would leave the Iraqi government entirely on its own in a battle against the strong factional and terrorist forces inside the country, a battle that it would almost certainly lose. And keeping the troop levels at current levels does nothing but perpetuate the situation that currently exists in the country—it leaves any chance of political success incomplete.

Of these three choices, this last is the most dangerous, because it follows a strategy of “wait and see.” It has been nearly five years since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the time is long past for Americans to decide how much this war is worth. Regardless of which option is chosen, a decision needs to be made, because the current method means certain failure. To forget this war for the economy, or any other issue, is to forget how important this war is to every part of American life. We need to decide whether we care more about spending millions and millions on blast walls in Baghdad and Fallujah, or on mortgage relief in Miami and Detroit. We need to decide whether we want occupation relief in Ramadi and Basra, or border security in Arizona and new schools in New York. To remember the issue is the first and most important step to making that decision.

The author is a Columbia College sophomore. He is a member of the Roosevelt Institution at Columbia University.